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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SECURITIES
ENFORCEMENT
The United States Congress and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) recently have focused attention on the global nature of
the securities market.' Technological advances in telecommunications and
computer capabilities have increased investors' access to international
securities markets. 2 Improved access to securities markets has led to an
increase in the dollar volume of United States equity securities traded by
foreign investors from $75.5 billion in 1981 to $481.9 billion in 1987.
3
Concurrently, United States investors are trading more heavily in foreign
securities. 4 Increased activity in the international market has shifted the
concentration of international capital from debt financing to equity fi-
nancing.5
I. THE CONFLICT
Although internationalization of the securities market has expanded
opportunities for legitimate investment activities, internationalization also
has created greater opportunities for securities fraud. 6 When American
1. See S. Rm. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,,(1988) (discussing International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988 (ISECA) as means to combat SEC enforcement problems
in international securities market); SEcuRrrias AND EXCHANGE ComMiSSION, 1987 REPORT TO
THE SENATE CoMMnrrE ON BANKING, HOusING AND URBAN AFAIs AND TE HOUSE CommiTTEE
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OP THE SECURITmS MARKETS,
(discussing effects of internationalization of securities market); Mann & Mad, Current Issues
in International Securities Law Enforcement, I SEcununs ENFORCEMENT INsTrrurE 7, 15 (1988)
[hereinafter Mann] (discussing enforcement problems confronting SEC because of internation-
alization of U.S. securities markets).
2. See Mann, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing rapid development of computer and
telecommunications capabilities that have made markets accessible to wider variety of investors).
Technological advances in computers and telecommunications permit instantaneous interna-
tional securities trading. Id. Fast, reliable communications provide deep markets for securities.
Id. By increasing trader volume, technological advances have increased liquidity of securities.
Id.
3. HousE CoMM. ON GOVERNME NT OPRATIONS, PROBLEMS wrrH THE SEC's ENFORCE-
MENT OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS IN CASES INVOLVING SusPICIous TRADES ORIGINATING FROM
ABROAD, H.R. REP. No. 1065, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988).
4. See Mann, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing United States investors' increased trading
in foreign securities). In 1986 United States investors held $102 billion in foreign equity
securities and United States pension funds held $45 billion in foreign assets. Id. Trading in
Eurobonds increased $1 trillion from 1985 to 1986. Id. Eurobonds are bonds that multinational
syndicates of banks and securities firms underwrite and sell to investors in countries other
than the country of the issuing entity. E. RoussAms, INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1983).
5. See Mann, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing increased reliance on equity financing in
raising international capital).
6. 134 CONG. REc. S8318 (daily ed. June 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Riegle) (discussing
International Securities and Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988 and increased opportunities
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citizens and foreigners conduct securities transactions within the United
States, both American citizens and foreigners trade subject to federal
securities laws that hold market participants strictly accountable for their
actions. 7 United States securities laws prohibit insider trading8 and require
United States market participants to comply with various disclosure re-
quirements.9 When United States citizens and foreigners execute transac-
tions through foreign intermediaries, however, foreign secrecy or blocking
laws may enable United States citizens and foreigners to evade United
States securities laws.' 0 Accordingly, participants in the capital markets
for fraud in international securities market); Goelzer, Mills, Gresham, Sullivan, The Role of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Transnational Acquisitions, 22 INF''L LAW.
615, 631 (1988) [hereinafter Goelzer] (discussing increasing complexity of investigating possible
fraud in U.S. securities market because of increasing international trading).
The recent increase in insider trading cases involving foreign traders and foreign trades
confirms that international securities fraud is increasing. See Pitt, Hardison, Salzer, Gardner,
SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 SEcmunms ENFORCEMENT INsTiTuTE 435, 476 (1988) (reviewing
recent insider trading cases) [hereinafter Pitt]. Between 1983 and 1987, the SEC brought 125
insider trading actions, approximately three times the number of cases instituted in the SEC's
first four and one half decades of existence. Id.
Two recent highly publicized insider trading cases demonstrate the magnitude of the insider
trading problem. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Boesky, No. 86-8767 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 14, 1986) (alleging that defendant traded in securities while possessing material nonpublic
information); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Levine, No. 86-3726 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 12,
1986) (alleging that defendant secretly purchased and sold securities of fifty-four companies
over a five year period through Bahamian bank while in possession of material nonpublic
information).
7. See Request for Comments Concerning a Concept to Improve the Commission's
Ability to Investigate and Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities in the U.S.
Markets from Other Countries, Exchange Act Release No. 21,186 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,648, at 86,980 (July 30, 1984) (discussing methods to hold all participants
in securities markets equally accountable under United States law).
8. See Insider Trading, 1986: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 38 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. John S. Shad, Chmn.
SEC) (discussing definition of insider trading). Although neither Congress nor the SEC expressly
has defined insider trading, recent court decisions and SEC actions suggest that insider trading
must include a breach of a fiduciary duty to stockholders by a person in a special position or
relationship with a company or a company's management or the misappropriation of infor-
mation obtained in the course of one's job by one either subject or not subject to a fiduciary
duty to stockholders. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1988) (rule lob-5 prohibits individuals or
companies from engaging in fraud in the purchase of securities); infra notes 26-34 and
accompanying text (discussing Congressional rationale for banning insider trading).
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a-c (1982) (requiring registration of securities in
order to provide investors with material information and to prevent misrepresentation, deceit,
and fraud); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78 (1982) (empowering SEC to
promulgate rules to ensure fairness and honesty in securities markets and to impose sanctions
on violators); see infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text (discussing Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934).
10. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 198 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman and
Chief-Executive-Officer of the American Stock Exchange). Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman of
the American Stock Exchange, has testified before Congressional committees on the difficulty
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trad securities subject to different degrees of accountability depending
on whether they operate inside or outside of the United States." This
imbalance in accountability fosters a fear that only specially informed
persons can trade profitably in the securities market 2 and undermines
public confidence in the United States securities market.'
3
Because of the destabilizing economic effects, lawmakers consider a
loss of confidence in the securities market to be unacceptable.'4 Recog-
nizing the need to tighten enforcement of securties laws in foreign-based
transactions, the SEC has recommended various legislative and adminis-
trative plans. 5 One recent SEC effort was the International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988 (ISECA).16 The SEC designed
ISECA to facilitate the gathering of evidence located in foreign countries
by promoting cooperation among international securities authorities.
7
of enforcing United States securities law in an increasingly international securities market. Id.
Typically, Levitt suggests, a suspicious trade on a United States market originates from a
foreign country. Id. The exchange's surveillance department might note, for example, that a
trade has occurred immediately prior to the involved company's announcement of a favorable
development. Id. When a particular trade arouses suspicion, an employee of the exchange
questions the member firm that handled the trade. Id. Often the exchange learns that the
investment company made the trade for the account of a foreign bank. Id. The exchange
often has no investigatory or disciplinary jurisdiction over the foreign bank because the bank
is not a member or member organization of the exchange. Id. Levitt notes that when the
exchange lacks jurisdiction over a bank, the exchange turns any necessary investigation over
to the SEC. Id. Although the foreign bank may have some jurisdictional, presence in the U.S.
because the bank maintains an American branch office, the bank may tell the SEC that the
bank acted only as an agent for a customer in the transaction. Id. The bank, therefore, may
refuse to divulge any information, including the customer's identity, because secrecy laws in
the bank's home country prohibit disclosure. Id.
11. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. securities laws and
opportunities to circumvent SEC enforcement of securities laws through foreign trading);
Begin, A Proposed Blueprint for Achieving Cooperation in Policing Transborder Securities
Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 68 (1986) (discussing foreign nondisclosure laws that allow
persons who trade through foreign entities to escape SEC enforcement of United States
securities laws).
12. Report of the Special Committee on Securities Law and Regulations, 66 A.B.A. REP.
340, 357 (1941) (discussing public perception that only persons with inside information can
make money in securities market).
13. See Begin, supra note 11, at 68 (noting that insider trading undermines public
confidence in securities market). The A.B.A. suggests if investors lack confidence in the
securities market, investors will invest less in the market or avoid investing in securities
altogether. Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Regulations Under
the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter Task Force]
41 Bus. LAW 223 (1985).
14. See 78 CoNG. REc. S2271 (1934) (statement of Senator Fletcher) (noting that fun-
damental purpose of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was to bolster confidence in securities
market and protect investors); infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text (discussing Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934).
15. See Mann, supra note 1, at 93-97 (discussing SEC initiatives to improve SEC
investigative ability in international securities cases).
16. S. 2544, 100th Cong., Id Sess. 101 et seq. (1988).
17. Id.
1989]
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ISECA also would have authorized the SEC to impose employment
restrictions on securities professionals that have engaged in professional
misconduct in foreign countries." Although Congress has failed to enact
ISECA as a whole, Congress may enact ISECA provisions in a piecemeal
fashion in 1989.' 9 Provisions of ISECA are necessary to supplement the
SEC's inadequate means of enforcing United States securities laws in
international trading.
20
A. United States Securities Law Policy
The emphasis on business secrecy in the laws of many foreign coun-
tries directly clashes with United States securities laws that require full
disclosure of information in securities transactions. 21 United States law,
for example, allows litigants in securities cases great latitude in the scope
of discovery. 22 Foreign laws, in contrast, usually prohibit extensive dis-
covery.23 United States lawmakers maintain that disclosure requirements
in securities transactions and prohibitions against insider trading are
necessary to insure order and integrity in the United States securities
market. 2
4
Congress designed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act)2 to protect average American investors. 26 Congress sought to prevent
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing current status of ISECA's
provisions).
20. See infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text (analyzing need for improved SEC
international enforcement tools).
21. See Begin, supra note 11, at 61-62 (contrasting American principles of full disclosure
of information in securities transactions with foreign principles of business secrecy).
22. FED. R. Cv. P. 26. Rule 26 allows all civil litigants, including the SEC, to employ
the full range of discovery methods, including taking of depositions, written interrogatories,
production of documents, and requests for admissions. Id.
23. See Begin, supra note 11, at 66 (noting that most foreign nations have more limited
discovery than United States).
24. See Lynch, Goldstein, Marcelino, -and Frenkel, Recent SEC Enforcement Develop-
ments, I SEctRurms ENFORCEMENT INSTrTUTE 99, 103 (1988) [hereinafter Lynch] (discussing
need for disclosure in securities transactions and for laws that prohibit insider trading). But
see H. MANNE, EcoNoac LiERTiS AND THE JuDicIARY 317-327 (1987) (arguing that laws
forbidding insider trading interfere with efficient functioning of securities market).
25. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78 (1983) (requiring that market
participants disclose adequate information that will permit persons to make informed investment
decisions).
26. See 78 CONO. REc. 52271 (1934) (statement of Senator Fletcher) (reviewing general
purposes of Exchange Act).
Before Congress enacted the Exchange Act, the Securities Act of 1933 provided the main
enforcement tools for policing the markets. Id. The Securities Act of 1933 addressed two main
Congressional objectives. SECURmTS AND EXCHANGE CoMMMSSION, THE WORK Or THE SEC 5-
8 (1986). First, Congress wanted investors to receive material information concerning securities
offered for public sale. Id. Second, Congress wanted to prevent misrepresentation, deceit, and
other fraud in the sale of securities. Id. The Securities Act of 1933 promotes both objectives
by requiring registration of securities and disclosure of financial information by the company
SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT
professional market operators from manipulating the market and deceiv-
ing the American public.27 The Exchange Act charges the SEC with
implementing federal securities laws in a manner that will insure fair and
honest markets.H Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act empowers the SEC
to protect securities investors by enacting rules and regulations that
prohibit fraudulent trading and manipulation of the securities market.
29
Pursuant to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC promulgated
rule lOb-5.3 0 Rule lOb-5 prohibits individuals and companies from engag-
ing in fraudulent or misleading practices in the securities market.3 ' The
Exchange Act requires professional market operators to disclose infor-
mation that will enable average investors to make an informed investment
decisions.3 2 Rule lOb-5 prohibits trading on inside information to prevent
insiders from trading against the interests of current and potential stock-
issuing a security. Id. Congress believed that extensive disclosure was crucial to maintain honest
markets. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934).
Congress enacted the Exchange Act because shareholders' inspection rights under the
Securities Act of 1933 are limited. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMSSION, Tim WORK OF THE
SEC 3-4, 9-13 (1986). The Exchange Act allows the SEC to promulgate rules and impose
sanctions for violators in order to ensure that the securities markets are fair and honest and
that corporations pay to provide investors with adequate investment information. Id.
27. See 78 CoNG. Rac. S2271 (statement of Senator Fletcher). S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934) (noting that purpose of Exchange Act is to protect investors from
stock price manipulation).
28. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 1, 15 U.S.C. 78(b) (1982).
29. Id.; see 78 CONG. REc. S2271 (1934) (statement of Senator Fletcher) (reviewing
general purposes of Exchange Act).
In addition to the powers that Congress granted the SEC under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, the SEC also combats securities fraud under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 and, more recently, under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3 thereunder
and the 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 is a general antifraud provision which prohibits
fraud in any offer or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. 77g(a) (1982). Section 17(a), therefore, is
similar to rule lob-5 under the Exchange Act. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1982) (Rule lOb-
5); infra notes 30-34 (discussing rule lob-5 and insider trading) .
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and rule 14e-3 prohibit any person from trading in a
security when the person possesses material, nonpublic information concerning a tender offer
and the offeror, issuer, or an insider provided the information. 15 U.S.C. 78t-1 (1982); 17
C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1988).
The 1984 Insider Trading Sanction Act allows the SEC to seek treble damages in a United
States district court against persons convicted of insider trading. Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
30. 17 C.F.R. 240.I0b-5 (1988) (Rule lOb-5) ; see Lynch, supra note 24, at 157 (discussing
SEC's promulgation of rule lOb-5). The SEC designed rule lOb-5 to close a loophole that
previously hindered the SEC's-ability to protect investors from securities fraud. SEC Release
No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Prior-to the SEC's promulgation of rule lOb-5, the law did not
prohibit individuals or companies from fraudulently buying and selling securities. Id.
31: 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1988). Prior to rule lOb-5's prohibition against fraudulent or
misleading practices in the purchase or sale of securities, the majority common law rule allowed
directors and officers to deal with present or prospective shareholders at arm's length with no
duty to disclose inside information. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358 (1933).
32. Id.
1989]
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holders.13 The United States prohibits insider trading because Congress
and the SEC have concluded that insider trading contradicts American
notions of fair play and erodes trust in the securities market.
3 4
B. Foreign Secrecy Laws
Many foreign nations do not share the philosophy of the United
States government concerning the impropriety of insider trading and,
therefore, have not enacted statutes to prohibit citizens from trading on
inside information.33 Although some foreign countries have enacted laws
that regulate insider trading,- authorities in these countries often ignore
33. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1988). See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), (holding that corporate directors, officers,
employees, and other "insiders" clearly have fiduciary duty to shareholders to either disclose
material nonpublic information about their corporation or abstain from trading in securities
of that corporation) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Several courts have modified the Texas Gulf holding. In Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court narrowed the duty to disclose and held that a duty to
disclose under rule lOb-5 does not arise from mere possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation. The Court held that a duty to disclose arises only from a fiduciary relationship or
other relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Id. In the absence
of such a relationship, a trader is not liable when the other party to the transaction suffers
damages because the other party lacked the same information as the trader. Id.
In Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Supreme Court
held that to determine whether an insider breached a fiduciary duty, the SEC must prove that
the insider sought a direct or indirect personal benefit from disclosure, such as a pecuniary
gain or reputational benefit that will transfer into future earnings.
Finally, in United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd on securities
law counts by an equally divided court, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987), the Court broadened the
doctrine of insider trading to include trading and tipping by persons who misappropriate
material nonpublic information from sources other than market participants.
34. Task Force, supra note 13, at 223. In 1985 the American Bar Association's Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities reviewed the policy basis for regulations that prohibit
insider trading. Id. The ABA committee concluded that two traditional bases exist for
prohibitions on insider trading. Id. First, insider trading contradicts American notions of fair
play. Id. The ABA report analogized a person trading on inside information to a card shark
with an ace up his sleeve. Id. The card shark, like the inside trader, has obtained an unfair
advantage over other players. Id. Consequently, the report concludes, American investors
abhor the inside trader and view noninsiders as victims. Id. Second, the A.B.A. observed that
insider trading erodes public trust in the market. Id. Investors will hesitate to trust their
resources to a marketplace that they perceive as unfair just as a card player will avoid placing
chips into a poker game that may be fixed. Id.
35. See Foreign Bank Secrecy and Disclosure Blocking Laws as a Barrier to SEC Policing
of Transnational Securities Fraud, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 259, 266 (1987) [hereinafter Foreign Bank
Secrecy] (discussing foreign nations' views toward insider trading). Some American commen-
tators share the view that government should not prohibit insider trading. See Hearings, supra
note 8, at 38 (statement of Hon. John S. Shad, Chairman SEC) (noting existence of school
of thought in U.S. that insider trading should be legal); MANNE, supra note 24 (noting school
of thought advocating legalization of insider trading); First Amendment and Federal Securities
Regulation, 20 CONN. L. REv. 260 (1988) (suggesting that federal securities regulations violate
first amendment by placing government restraints on written and oral communications).
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violations.3 6 Many foreign nations also do not share the philosophy of
the United States government concerning full disclosure of information
in securities transactions and expansive discovery in securities litigation.
37
Many of these foreign nations have long-established traditions favoring
a right to privacy in business transactions.38 When a foreign bank executes
a trade for a customer, foreign secrecy laws often prevent the bank from
disclosing the customer's identity and, accordingly, frustrate SEC inves-
tigative and enforcement efforts. 39 Secrecy in the bank-customer relation-
ship in foreign countries originated with the emergence of commercial
bank activity in the sixteenth century.40 Great Britain, for example,
developed the common law principle that an implied contract arises from
a bank customer relationship. 4' British common law, therefore, obligated
banks to maintain secrecy regarding the state of a customer's account,
any transactions in which the customer engaged, and any other infor-
mation about the customer that the bank acquired through keeping the
customer's account. 42 Other foreign countries developed secrecy laws to
protect bank customers from oppressive or vindictive governments 
3 in
1934, the Swiss enacted a bank secrecy statute partially in reaction to
efforts of Nazi German agents to ascertain the identity of German Jews
who had established Swiss bank accounts. 44 The Swiss statute actually
codified a two-hundred year old Swiss business practice. 45 Finally, some
36. Foreign Bank Secrecy, supra note 35, at 266. In France, for example, authorities
rarely enforce the statute that prohibits insider trading because insider trading is a tradition
among the most respectable corporate directors and officers. Id. Many French citizens consider
tipping of information to be a social duty among relatives and friends. Id.
37. See Begin, supra note 11, at 65-66 (contrasting American principles of full disclosure
of information in securities transactions with foreign principles of business secrecy).
38. See id. (discussing many foreign nations' long-established traditions regarding right to
privacy in business transactions); Pitt, Hardison, and Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the
Multinational Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 374, 4902-09 (1987) (discussing secrecy
laws of foreign countries that prohibit disclosure of business records or identities of bank
customers).
39. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 631 (noting that foreign nondisclosure' laws prevent
foreign banks from disclosing traders' identities to SEC). Generally, foreign governments enact
bank secrecy laws to preserve confidentiality between bankers and their customers, to protect the
financial assets of bank customers against unwarranted governmental expropriation and to
promote banking activity in the local economy. See S. Rm,. No. 130, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. I
(1988) (reviewing secrecy laws in foreign countries).
40. See Fedders, Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the Internitionalization of
the Securities Markets, 6 J. Comp. Bus. & CnirAL MArT L. 27, 30 (1984) (discussing
background and rationale of secrecy laws).
41. See Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 416 (1924)
(explaining that common-law duty of confidentiality arising from relationship between banker
and customer prohibits bank from disclosing information concerning bank's clients).
42. Fedders, supra note 40, at 30.
43. Id, at 31.
44, Id. The Swiss enacted a bank secrecy statute after a small number of Swiss banking
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countries have enacted bank secrecy laws to attract foreign capital in an
attempt to duplicate Switzerland's success as a financial power.
46
C. Foreign Blocking Laws
Like foreign secrecy laws, foreign blocking laws also frustrate SEC
enforcement of United States securities laws.47 Blocking laws prohibit
foreign recipients of United States discovery orders from allowing United
States authorities to inspect, copy, or remove documents from the enacting
state.4 Some blocking laws generally prohibit recipients of United States
discovery requests from cooperating with United States authorities.
4 9
Other blocking laws empower an official of the enacting state to invoke
the blocking law under particular circumstances. 0 Foreign governments
have enacted blocking laws in response to United States efforts to apply
United States laws, particularly antitrust laws, beyond the borders of the
United States.5 1 Many foreign states view any effort to apply United
States laws beyond United States borders as a violation of the foreign
state's sovereignty and as an improper effort to export American eco-
nomic, social, and judicial values.5 2 Furthermore, United States law
provides for much broader pretrial discovery than the laws of most foreign
countries.53 Many countries, therefore, believe that compliance with United
States discovery requests would undermine the integrity of their own
judicial systems.5 4 Finally, some countries disagree with United States
46. Id. at 31-32. The British Cayman Islands, for example, have sought to duplicate
Switzerland's financial success. Id. The British Cayman Islands have enacted several laws in an
effort to attract foreign capital and create international business in banking and finance. Id. The
British Cayman Islands have bank secrecy laws, impose little or no taxation on foreign funds,
and do not recognize the evasion of another country's tax laws as a crime. Id.
47. See Fedders, supra note 40, at 36-37 (discussing foreign blocking laws as obstacle to
SEC enforcement of United States securities laws).
48. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. 49, 5(1) (1984) [hereinafter
CFMEA] (empowering Canadian Attorney-General to prevent disclosure or release of documents).
CFMEA allows the Canadian Attorney-General to block the transfer of records to U.S. agencies.
Id. To invoke these powers, the Attorney-General must determine that a foreign state or tribunal
has taken or likely will take measures that affect Canada's international trade or commerce
adversely. Id.
49. See Fedders, supra note 40, at 35-39 (discussing background and rationale of foreign
blocking laws).
50. Id. Some countries' blocking laws authorize a government official to prevent disclosure
of certain documents under various circumstances. Id. In Austria, for example, the Austrian
Attorney-General may restrict the disclosure of documents or information either when a foreign
court exercises jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent with international law or when restriction will
protect national interests. Id.
51. Id. at 36.
52. Id. Because blocking laws are designed to protect national interests, private parties may
not waive the provisions of blocking laws. See id., at 35-39 (discussing blocking laws).
53. Id. at 37; see supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing broad scdpe of discovery
in United States civil cases).
54. See Fedders, supra note 40, at 35-39 (noting belief among some foreign governments
that compliance with U.S. discovery orders would undermine foreign judicial systems).
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laws that prohibit insider trading and, therefore, refuse to cooperate in
SEC insider trading investigations.
5
II. THE SEC's ENFORCEMENT DHEMMA
Because the policies underlying United States securities laws sharply
conflict with the secrecy laws of many foreign nations, the SEC experi-
ences difficulty in enforcing United States securities laws in an increasingly
international securities market 6 Congress did not, in fact, design the
SEC's enforcement powers with today's international market in mind.
57
Increasing internationalization of the capital markets has made even
preliminary investigations of alleged securities law violations more diffi-
cult.58 Witnesses that reside in foreign countries and evidence that is
located abroad have hampered recent SEC investigations. 9 When the SEC
seeks information, such as the identity of a trader, through the SEC's
normal investigatory powers or under United States discovery rules,
foreign secrecy laws often frustrate the SEC's efforts. 60
A. Znadequacy of the Court System
Federal securities law grants to the SEC investigative powers, including
the power to serve subpoenas, to determine whether a securities law
55. Id.; see Foreign Bank Secrecy, supra note 35, at 266 (noting that many European
countries do not have statutes prohibiting insider trading).
56. See supra notes 21-55 and accompanying text (comparing policies of U.S. securities
laws and foreign nondisclosure laws).
57. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of SEC and rule
lOb-5).
58. See SEcURITIEs AND EXCHAIGE CoMMIssION, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITraEE ON
BArmwG, HousnlG AND URBAN AFAims AND Em HousE ComrTE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
ON Tma INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ma SEctRrrims MARuTs (1987) (noting that internationali-
zation of securities market frustrates SEC investigation of alleged federal securities violations).
When part of a trade occurs outside the United States, the SEC often has difficulty making
even a preliminary inquiry into the circumstances of the trade to determine whether parties
have violated U.S. securities laws. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 631 (discussing SEC's difficulties
enforcing United States securities laws internationally). The SEC must establish both personal
and subject matter jurisdiction before the SEC may engage in pre-trial discovery to investigate
allegations of transnational securities fraud. See Foreign Bank Secrecy, supra note 35, at 259
n.2 (discussing jurisdictional requirements that SEC must satisfy in order to engage in pretrial
discovery); Moessle, The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law Enforcement in
International Cases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 3 (discussing jurisdictional complications in securities
cases involving foreign elements).
59. Memorandum of the SEC in Support of the International Securities Enforcement
Cooperation Act of 1988 [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,240, at 89,111
(June 3, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Support Memo]. Difficulties in obtaining foreign evidence
affect not only securities regulators but also regulators of other areas of international commerce.
See Compelling Discovery in Transnational Litigation, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.-& POL. 1217
(1984) (discussing difficulties of obtaining evidence in transnationa litigation).
60. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 631 (discussing foreign secrecy laws as impediment to
effective SEC enforcement of U.S. securities law).
1989]
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violation has occurred.6' Courts repeatedly have upheld the SEC's au-
thority to serve investigative subpoenas that require United States citizens
and foreigners residing in the United States to produce evidence that is
located in a foreign country. 62 When the SEC has attempted to subpoena
a foreign citizen to testify or produce documents from that foreign
country, however, United States courts have differed on whether United
States law or the law of the foreign country determines whether the
foreigner must comply with the subpoena.63 If the foreigner refuses to
comply with the investigative subpoena, the SEC may bring an action
that alleges a violation of United States securities law and ask a court to
compel discovery pursuant to rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure rule.64 A United States court has wide discretion to grant or
refuse a rule 37 motion to compel discovery. 65 Although United States
courts often resolve rule 37 disclosure conflicts in favor of the SEC,
courts scrutinize the facts of each individual case and, in some circum-
stances, hold that the foreign source need not comply with the discovery
order. 66 Even when the court grants an SEC motion to compel discovery
61. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 21(b), 15 U.S.C. 78u(b) (1982) (granting
investigative powers to SEC).
62. Mines and Metals Corp. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 200 F.2d 317 (9th Cir.
1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 941 (1953) (holding that SEC may require production of books
and records located in foreign country); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Minas de Artemisa,
S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945) (holding that Congress empowered SEC to require attendance
of witnesses or production of documents from any location so long as service of subpoena
occurs within United States); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing SEC to subpoena customer records from' Swiss bank
that had placed orders from Switzerland for purchase of securities on New York Stock
Exchange).
63. Compare Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Zanganeh, 470 F. Supp. 1307 (D.D.C. 1978)
(indicating that SEC might have authority to subpoena alien nonresident if nonresident had
submitted to United States jurisdiction by residing or doing business in United States ) with
CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction to
enforce CFTC investigative subpoena, which is similar to SEC investigative subpoena, served
upon Brazilian citizen in Brazil). See Pitt, supra note 6, at 535-36 (comparing investigative
subpoena authority of SEC and Commodities Futures Trade Commission). The statutes granting
investigative subpoena authority to the SEC and the CFTC are nearly identical. Id. Therefore,
courts should reach similar results regarding the authority of the agencies to issue valid
investigative subpoenas. Id.
64. FED. R. Crv. P. 37 (empowering courts to order discovery and impose sanctions
for failure to comply with discovery); see infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing
application of rule 37 in case involving foreign bank); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. 78 (1982) (authorizing SEC to bring action in United States district court against
person suspected of violating United States securities laws and rules or regulations thereunder).
65. FED. R. Crv. P. 37 (granting court discretion to decide rule 37 motion to compel
discovery).
66. See Pitt, supra note 6, at 539 (discussing tests that federal courts use in resolving
discovery conflicts between foreign entities and U.S. authorities).
Federal courts have employed three different tests to resolve conflicts between foreign
entitiesi'and U.S. authorities seeking to compel discovery. Id.
First, some courts have refused to compel production on the grounds of international
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of evidence about a matter over which the United States clearly has
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, foreign sources subject to secrecy
or blocking laws may refuse to cooperate with. United States discovery
orders. 67 If the foreign source refuses to comply with a United States
discovery order, the SEC may ask the court for sanctions that freeze or
confiscate assets of the foreign source within the United States." Even
severe sanctions often will not compel a foreign source to comply with a
United States discovery order. 69 In certain cases the SEC may decline to
comity when producing evidence would violate foreign laws. See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d
494 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that court should not issue contempt orders to compel foreign
persons to produce documents in violation of foreign law), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987);
Ings. v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that New York office of Canadian
bank need not produce records located in Canada).
Second, some courts apply the balancing test in Section 40 of the Restatement (Second)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (1965); see infra notes 74-87 and accompanying
text (discussing case that applies balancing test to determine that defendant must disclose
traders' identities even though disclosure violates Swiss bank secrecy law). Under the Restate-
ment a court must consider: the vital national interests of each state; the extent and nature
of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the defendant; the
extent to which the discovery is to take place in the territory of the foreign state; the nationality
of the defendant; and the extent to which United States authority reasonably can expect an
enforcement action to achieve compliance with United States law. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TH FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (1965). When courts apply the
Restatement's balancing approach, courts usually determine that the United States authority's
interest in enforcing United States subpoenas outweighs the foreign sovereign's interest in
maintaining the secrecy of the, information. Id. United States interests usually prevail in
securities fraud cases. See Pitt, supra note 6, at 540 (discussing United States courts' application
of Restatement 40); infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text (court applying Restatement 40
to hold that U.S. interests outweighed foreign interests when. SEC sought identities of unknown
stock purchasers). But see United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
Cayman Island's interest in bank secrecy laws more s\gnificant than defendant's interest in
compelling production of records). )
Finally, some courts consider the good faith of the party resisting production. See Societe
Internationale Pour Participants Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958) (refusing to impose sanctions for noncompliance with subpoena where foreign party
had made substantial efforts to comply with United States law and did not deliberately court
legal impediments in foreign jurisdiction).
67. See Mann, supra note I, at 35 (discussing foreign entities' use of nondisclosure laws
to avoid United States discovery orders); Pitt, supra note 6, at 534-536 (discussing United
States courts' reactions to foreign entities' refusals to comply with United States discovery
orders).
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (allowing SEC to request sanctions against entity that
refuses to comply with discovery orders).
69., See Begin, supra note 11, at 76 (discussing inefficiency of judicial system as means
to enforce U.S. securities laws internationally). When an individual or an entity in a foreign
country refuses to cooperate voluntarily in a SEC investigation, the SEC must wait until the
individual enters the U.S. or seek the foreign country's assistance to develop the required
evidence. Memorandum in Support of the International Securities Enforcement and Cooperation
Act of 1988,.[1987-88 Transfer.Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,240, at 89,112 (June 3,
1988).
When a foreign government cooperates with the SEC and consents to service of compulsory
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ask the court to impose sanctions on a foreign source because judicial
proceedings are expensive and time consuming. 70 Furthermore, foreign
policy considerations sometimes preclude the use of judicial proceedings
because judicial proceedings may adversely affect foreign goodwill.
71
Numerous procedural drawbacks, therefore, render current SEC enforce-
ment powers inadequate to police the international securities market. 72
B. SEC Efforts to Obtain Evidence Through Judicial Means
Two recent cases illustrate the high cost and procedural difficulty of
obtaining information protected by foreign secrecy laws through ordinary
judicial means.7 3 In SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiano74 the SEC sought
to discover the names of persons that the SEC alleged had traded on inside
information. 75 The SEC alleged that unknown individuals purchased call
option contracts for the stock of St. Joe Minerals Corporation (St. Joe)
through a Swiss bank one day before Joseph E. Seagrams & Company
announced a proposed tender offer for.all outstanding shares of St. Joe.
76
Entering a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, the SEC received a temporary restraining order
freezing the profits from the transactions on deposit in New York's Irving
Trust bank.77 The SEC subsequently brought an action for violation of
process on its citizens, direct service of a U.S. subpoena abroad is legal under international
law. Foreign Bank Secrecy supra note 35 at 261, n.14.
70. See Memorandum in Support of the International Securities Enforcement and Co-
operation Act of 1988, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,240, at 89,112
(June 3, 1988) (noting that judicial proceedings against foreign entities are expensive and time
consuming). Even if an individual enters the United States and the SEC effectively serves the
individual with a subpoena to produce documents located in a foreign country, the subsequent
subpoena enforcement actions and contempt proceedings are protracted and expensive. Id. In
one case, the SEC spent approximately $1 million more than the amount of illegal profits
potentially recoverable in an investigation and recovery that took almost five years. Begin,
supra note 11, at 85, n.132 (quoting John Fedders, then Director of Division of Enforcement
of Securities and Exchange Commission).
71. Pitt, supra note 6, at 534-536 (noting that SEC may decide not to initiate judicial
proceedings against foreign entities because judicial proceedings may endanger foreign policy
objectives). Because sanctions may cause friction with local authorities and create diplomatic
ramifications, the SEC may choose not to ask a court to impose sanctions on a foreign entity
that refuses to comply with a U.S. discovery order. Id.
72. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of current SEC
international enforcement powers).
73. See infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which SEC has
used courts to obtain confidential foreign information); Begin, supra note 11, at 84-85
(discussing inadequacy of judicial process to enforce U.S. securities laws).
74. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
75. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111,
112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
76. Id. at 112-13. In St. Joe the unknown individuals purchased the St. Joe call options
for a premium of $14 over the market price one day before Joseph E. Seagrams & Co.
announced a proposed tender offer for all outstanding shares of St. Joe. Id.
77. Id. at 223. The court in St. Joe granted a temporary restraining order because of
the SEC's inability to learn the identity of the purchaser and the need to prevent the profits
from the allegedly illegal transactions from leaving the jurisdiction of the U.S. Id.
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United States securities law in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York . 7  The SEC named as defendants Banca
della Svizzera Italiano (BSI), the Swiss bank through which the unknown
purchasers had placed the original questionable orders, Irving Trust Com-
pany, the United States bank where BSI had deposited the proceeds of the
trade, and "certain purchasers" whose identity was unknown at the time
of filing.i
9
After BSI refused to answer interrogatories concerning the purchasers'
identities, the SEC moved for an order to compel discovery and asked for
contempt sanctions against BSI that included a $50,000 per day fine and
an order to cease and desist trading in the United States securities market.
8 0
BSI defended its refusal to reveal the purchasers' identities on the ground
that disclosure of BSI's customer would violate Swiss secrecy laws and
subject BSI to Swiss civil and criminal liability.8' The court rejected BSI's
argument and ordered BSI to disclose the identities of the purchasers.8 2 The
court reasoned that the SEC's interest in ensuring the integrity of United
States financial markets outweighed the defendants' interests, namely Switz-
erland's interest in upholding Swiss secrecy law and BSI's interest in avoiding
fines and imprisonment of BSI officers.8 3 The court warned that if BSI
failed to comply with the disclosure order, the court would enter severe
contempt sanctions against BSI. 4 In response to the court's warning, BSI
obtained a waiver of the Swiss secrecy law from the purchasers and disclosed
the purchasers' identities' to the SEC.8 Five years after the start of the
action, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York ruled that the purchasers had engaged in illegal insider trading. 6 The
court, therefore, ordered the purchasers to disgorge $3.5 million in illegal
profits with interest.Y
78. Id. at 111.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 113. In St. Joe the court was able to pressure the defendant with meaningful
contempt sanctions for failure to comply with the court's discovery order because the court
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant and control over some of the defendant's assets.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 117-19.
83. See Id. (applying balancing test in section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law); see supra note 66 (discussing balancing test in section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law).
84. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Banca della Svizzera Italiano, 92 F.R.D. 111,
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
85. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. at 596 (1986) (criminal
action against identified St. Joe defendants).
86. Tome 638 F. Supp. at 626-28. Although the SEC was able to determine the traders'
identities through a rule 37 order in St. Joe and successfully prosecute defendants for insider
trading, the SEC allocated an inordinate amount of resources and manpower to the task. See
Fedders, supra note 35, at 9-10 (discussing use of F.R. Crv. P. rule 37 discovery order in St.
Joe case).
87. Tome, 638 F. Supp. at 626-28.
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Instead of seeking to compel discovery through a court order, the SEC
may request discovery assistance from a foreign government in a securities
fraud action against a foreign defendant in a United States court.8s For
example, in SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of
and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corp. 9
the SEC investigated a suspicious securities transaction that involved un-
known foreign purchasers. 90 In October 1981 unknown purchasers bought
3,000 call options in the stock of Santa Fe International Corporation (Santa
Fe) and 27,000 shares of Santa Fe stock in a two week period before an
announcement that Santa Fe would merge into a subsidiary of the Kuwait
Petroleum Corp. (KPC).91 The SEC filed an insider trading suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against
the unknown purchasers, one named individual, and certain Swiss banks.92
The SEC successfully moved for a preliminary injunction, freezing the
unknown purchasers' profits in the United States pending a trial on the
merits. 93 The SEC submitted interrogatories that requested the Swiss banks
to disclose the identities of the unknown purchasers. 94 The banks claimed
that disclosure would violate Swiss secrecy laws and, therefore, refused to
disclose the purchasers' identities. 95 Instead of seeking a court order com-
pelling discovery and threatening sanctions, the SEC appealed to the Swiss
government under the 1977 Switzerland-United States Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Treaty96 and the 1982 Switzerland-United States Memo-
randum of Understanding9 7 and formally requested the Swiss Department
of Justice and Policy to assist the SEC in obtaining the identities of the
unknown purchasers. 9
The Swiss initially refused to assist the SEC, stating that the SEC had
failed to allege sufficient facts to indicate whether the unknown purchasers
88. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text (discussing SEC efforts to obtain
foreign evidence through a combination of judicial efforts and foreign assistance).
89. No. 81-6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
90. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common
Stock of and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 817 F.2d 1018 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
91. Id. Immediately following the transactions at issue in Santa Fe, Kuwait Petroleum
Corp. offered $51 per share for Santa Fe common stock. Prior to the merger announcement,
Santa Fe was trading in the low $20's. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 633-35 (discussing facts of Santa Fe).
95. Id.
96. The Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Swiss Confeder-
ation and the United States, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
97. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Switzerland to
Establish Acceptable Means for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the
Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982 [hereinafter Swiss MOMt].
98. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 633-35 (discussing facts of Santa Fe case).
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had violated Swiss iaw.9 After the SEC alleged additional facts, the Swiss
disclosed the unknown purchasers' identities to the SEC.'°0 Meanwhile,
pursuant to a SEC request under the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence
Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York issued letters rogatory'0' to courts
in England and France, requesting relevant evidence concerning the Santa
Fe transaction.'02 The British complied with the request for evidence. 03
Finally, more than four years after the SEC initiated the Santa Fe action,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
ordered the identified purchasers to disgorge $7.8 .million in illegal trading
profits.104 Although the SEC succeeded in the St. Joe and Santa Fe cases,
the high cost and procedural difficulties of obtaining information in both
cases suggests that current SEC investigative and enforcement tools are
inefficient.' 5
III. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SEcuRITIEs LAWS
A. The Hague Convention
If the SEC is to enforce United States securities laws internationally,
the SEC must use means more effective and efficient than the United States
judicial system.10 The United States has entered into several international
agreements in an effort to improve the SEC's ability to enforce United
States securities laws throughout the world.' °7 The Hague Convention on
99. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 633-35 (discussing use of Swiss treaty in Santa Fe).
Under Swiss law a nation requesting investigative assistance must allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate a violation of Swiss law as a prerequisite for Swiss assistance. Id.
100. Id.
101. Letters Rogatory are formal written communications from a court in which an action
is pending to a foreign court or judge requesting testimony or evidence located in the foreign
jurisdiction. BL. cK's LAw DicTONAoY 815 (5th ed. 1979).
102. Goelzer, supra note 6, at 633-35. The letters rogatory to England sought the testimony
of two former employees of a London based bank incorporated in Luxembourg that had
placed orders for Santa Fe securities on behalf of one or more of the unknown purchasers.
Id.
103. Id. The High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, rejected the British bankers'
contention that disclosure of the evidence relating to the Santa Fe transaction would violate
British secrecy laws. Id. The U.K. courts held that applying British secrecy laws to the evidence
relating to the Santa Fe transaction would not be in the public's best interest. Id. France's
response to the letters rogatory connected with the Santa Fe transaction is unclear.
104. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock
of and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
105. See supra notes 73-104 and accompanying text (discussing St. Joe and Santa Fe
cases).
106. See infra notes 138-184 and accompanying text (discussing legislative efforts to
improve SEC international enforcement tools). .I
107. See infra notes 108-36 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. international agree-
ments designed to improve SEC's international enforcement of U.S. securities laws).
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Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters (Convention)'0s
represents the first major effort of the United States government to establish
international norms under which commercial and civil litigants might obtain
evidence from foreign countries.109 Signatories to the Convention may use
the Convention's procedures only in connection with judicial proceedings." 10
Furthermore, most signatories to the Convention have exercised their right
under Article 23 of the Convention to refuse to provide pretrial discovery
of documents."' Accordingly, the restrictive scope of the Hague Convention
renders the Convention a largely ineffective tool for international enforce-
ment of United States securities laws."
2
B. Mutual Assistance Treaties
In contrast to the SEC's weak record with the Hague Convention and
court orders, the SEC has made significant progress in enforcing United
States securities law through mutual assistance treaties and memoranda of
understanding between the United States and foreign nations."' The United
States has signed mutual assistance treaties with Switzerland, Canada, the
Cayman Islands, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Turkey, and Italy." 4 Mutual
assistance treaties provide procedures for mutual investigative assistance in
criminal matters."' Because the United States only recently has entered into
108. The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters,
March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
109. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 635 (discussing provisions of Hague Convention). The
Hague Convention employs three devices for foreign discovery: letters rogatory, the taking of
evidence by a consular official, and private commissioners. See Mann, supra note 1, at 79-89
(discussing provisions of Hague Convention and SEC experience under Hague Convention).
110. Mann, supra note 1, at 79. Because signatories to the Convention may use the
Convention only in connection with judicial proceedings, the Convention is of limited use in
SEC investigations of securities fraud. Id. The SEC has, however, used the Convention's
procedures successfully during the course of trial. See supra notes 89-104 (discussing case in
which court asked Great Britain for assistance in discovery pursuant to Hague Convention).
111. Mann, supra note 1, at 79. Article 23 of the Hague Convention allows signatories
to refuse to execute letters rogatory for the purpose of pretrial discovery of documents. Id.
Pretrial testimony is available under the Convention if the testimony is intended for use at
trial. Id. Because desired evidence often is preliminary and necessary to obtain dispositive
proof, the SEC may have difficulty demonstrating that the testimony is intended for use at
trial. Id.
112. See id. (discussing Hague Convention's usefulness in SEC investigations).
113. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 636 (discussing SEC's successful use of treaties and
memoranda of understanding to enforce U.S. securities laws internationally). In Santa Fe, for
example, the SEC used the Swiss Treaty and the Swiss Memorandum of Understanding to
learn the identities of traders suspected of violating insider trading laws. Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call Options for
the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1013 (1988); see supra note 88-104 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's use of
Swiss Treaty and Swiss Memorandum of Understanding in Sante Fe).




mutual assistance treaties for the production of evidence, the SEC's expe-
rience with mutual assistance treaties is limited. 116 Most of the SEC's
experience in using treaties to obtain evidence is with the Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and Switzerland
(Swiss Treaty)." 7 The Swiss Treaty provides that the United States and
Swiss governments will provide each other with broad assistance in criminal
matters, including assistance in locating witnesses, obtaining statements and
testimony of witnesses, production and authentication of business records,
and service of judicial or administrative documents."' During a criminal
investigation or judicial proceeding, the treaty allows either government, or
an agency within the government, to request assistance from the foreign
government." 9 Although the SEC institutes only civil or administrative
actions, the SEC may use the Swiss Treaty because United States securities
laws provide for criminal penalties. 20 In order to invoke the treaty, the
offense under investigation must be criminal in nature in both the requesting
and executing state.'12 Until recently, Swiss criminal law did not prohibit
insider trading.'2 Consequently, the SEC previously could not request
assistance from the Swiss government under the Swiss Treaty in insider
trading cases.'23 Now that the Swiss have enacted laws that ban insider
trading, the SEC may use treaty mechanisms to obtain information from
Switzerland for investigations into potential insider trading violations.' 24
C. Memoranda of Understanding
In addition to mutual assistance treaties, memoranda of understanding
(MOU) between the SEC and foreign regulators help the SEC to enforce
116. See Pitt, supra note 6, at 544 (discussing SEC's limited use of mutual assistance
treaties).
117. Swiss Treaty, supra note 96.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Mann, supra note 1, at 58 (explaining that SEC may use Swiss Treaty because
U.S. securities laws provide for criminal penalties).
121. Swiss Treaty, supra note 96.
122. See Mann, supra note 1, at 62 (noting that Swiss enacted law prohibiting insider
trading in 1987).
123. See Mann, supra note 1, at 58-59 (discussing SEC's use of Swiss treaty). But see
supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text (discussing insider trading case in which Swiss
assisted SEC before Swiss enacted law against insider trading). In Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call Options for
the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1013 (1988), the SEC obtained Swiss assistance in an insider trading case by alleging
that a "tippee," as opposed to an "insider," purchased stock while in possession of nonpublic
information. Id. An insider is a person who is aware of information that he must keep secret.
Mann, supra note 1, at 63. A tippee is a person who receives insider information from an
insider. Id. Under Swiss law, at the time of Santa Fe, an insider who trades may not be guilty
of a violation of Swiss law. Id. A tippee who trades while in possession of inside information
would violate Swiss law. Id.
124. See Mann, supra note 1, at 69 (discussing SEC use of Swiss Treaty under new Swiss
law against insider trading); Diplomatic Notes exchanged between U.S. & Switzerland (Novem-
ber 10, 1987); Swiss Approve Insider Bill, N.Y. Times Dec. 17, 1987, at D6.
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United States securities laws.2 - Memoranda of understanding are nonbinding
agreements between the SEC and foreign securities regulators that facilitate
mutual assistance in specified matters. 2 6 The SEC has entered into memo-
randa of understanding with foreign securities regulators in the United
Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, Switzerland, and the Canadian provinces of On-
tario, Quebec and British Columbia. 27 Memoranda of Understanding for-
malize methods through which the SEC and foreign regulators may exchange
information and enforce securities laws. 12 Under the Canadian MOU, for
example, the SEC and Canadian securities regulators agreed to provide
mutual access to information in agency files and to take testimony and
obtain documents from persons under investigation. 29 An important advan-
tage of MOU's over mutual assistance treaties is that most SEC memoranda
do not require that the subject of the request involve a criminal offense
under the laws of both countries.3 0 Furthermore, because the foreign party
to the MOU has agreed to provide evidence to the SEC, the SEC may
avoid unilateral attempts to obtain evidence.' 3' By avoiding unilateral at-
tempts to obtain evidence, the SEC ensures deference to foreign sovereignty
and, thereby, minimizes international resentment. 132
Despite the advantages of MOUs, the SEC has noted two significant
shortcomings to the use of memoranda of understanding. 3 First, initially
125. See Mann, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing SEC's use of memoranda of understanding
to enforce U.S. securities law).
126. See Mann, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that purpose of SEC memoranda of under-
standing is to facilitate mutual assistance between securities regulators).
127. See Goelzer, supra note 6, at 637-40 (discussing history of SEC memoranda of
understanding).
128. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 253-265 (discussing provisons of memoranda of
understanding for exchanging information and enforcing securities law).
129. See Mann, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing MOU with Canada). In addition to
facilitating access to agency files, the taking of testimony, and the showing of documents, the
Canadian MOU provides that securities regulators will investigate, using subpoena power when
necessary, on behalf of one another to ensure that the requesting party obtains necessary
information. Id. at 77.
130. See id. at 72 (comparing MOUs with mutual assistance treaties). Currently, the SEC,
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), and the British Columbia Securities Commission
(BCSC) lack the authority to investigate on behalf of a foreign securities regulator unless there
is also an independent violation of domestic law. Id. The SEC, the OSC, and the BCSC
agreed upon signing their respective MOU's to seek legislative authority to conduct investiga-
tions of violations of foreign securities law when foreign securities regulators request assistance.
Id. See infra notes 138-146 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's request for legislative
authority to conduct investigations of alleged violations of foreign securities law). Until the
respective legislatures authorize the SEC, OSC, and BCSC to investigate violations of foreign
securities law, these regulators may assist each other only under their general investigate
powers. Mann, supra note 1 at 77.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing international resentment of
U.S. attempts to apply U.S. laws extraterritorially). Unilateral attempts that commonly upset
foreign countries include discovery orders and sanctions. Id.
133. See Begin, supra note 11, at 75 (evaluating effectiveness of MOU's).
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negotiating memoranda of understanding drains the SEC's limited resources
of time and money.',34 Second, because nations regulate different aspects 6f
securities trading, the regulatory effect of each MOU will vary. 13 5 Accord-
ingly, some critics suggest that memoranda of understanding will result only
in a patchwork of regulation, not an effective enforcement tool. 3 6
D. Internatlonal Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988
The principle weaknesses of existing forms of international agreements
are that mutual assistance treaties and MOU's cover only certain offenses
and promote only limited international cooperation.'37 Reacting to congres-
sional and SEC frustration over the difficulties of enforcing United States
securities laws internationally, on June 3, 1988 David S. Ruder, Chairman
of the SEC, introduced the International Securities and Enforcement Co-
operation Act of 1988 (ISECA) to the United States Senate. 138 ISECA was
the SEC's first comprehensive proposal to Congress to address the problems
associated with enforcing securities laws in an international market. 39 The
proposed legislation would have amended federal securities law to facilitate
international cooperation among securities regulators."' First, ISECA would
have enabled the SEC, at the request of foreign authorities, to require
persons or entities in the United States to produce evidence related to a
potential violation of the foreign country's securities laws. 141 Second, ISECA
would have amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to permit
the SEC to maintain the confidentiality of certain foreign evidence 1 42 Third,
134, Id.
135. Id. Because nations hold differing views on the proper scope of securities regulation,
nations emphasize different securities law provisions, Id. Consequently, the SEC may be able
to enforce certain laws only when certain countries are involved. Id.
136. Id. at 76.
137. See supra notes 105-136 and accompanying text (discussing scope of international
agreements for production of evidence); Mann, supra note 1, at 58 (discussing weaknesses of
international agreements for production of evidence).
138. See Transmittal Letter to the U.S. Senate, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,240, at 89,109 (June 3, 1988) (recommending that U.S, Senate enact ISECA).
The SEC Chairman's transmittal letter to the U.S. Senate notes that the International Securities
and Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988 (ISECA) addressed the difficulties of enforcing
U.S. securities laws internationally by facilitating greater international cooperation. Id. The
SEC Chairman stated that the SEC believed ISECA would strengthen international cooperation
in securities law enforcement and facilitate greater investigative cooperation among foreign
securities regulators. Id,
139. Id.
140, Id, According to one U.S. Senator, by enacting ISECA Congress would demonstrate
that the United States views securities fraud as an international problem and wants the SEC
to take the lead in establishing a cooperative approach to combat the international securities
fraud problem. 134 CONG. REc. S8318 (daily ed. June 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
141. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101(c) (1988); S. RE. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1988). Under existing law' the SEC could not compel production of documents and
testimony unless it appeared that a violation of U.S. securities law had occurred. Id.
142. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 102(b) (1988).
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ISECA explicitly would have authorized the SEC to provide documents and
other information in SEC files to foreign authorities. 43 Fourth, ISECA
would have authorized the SEC to impose sanctions on securities profes-
sionals who have been convicted of illegal or improper conduct by a foreign
authority.'" Unfortunately, Congress failed to enact ISECA during the 1988
term.
41
ISECA significantly would have strengthened the SEC's arsenal of tools
to enforce United States securities law internationally.'" Title I of ISECA,
which consisted of three parts, would have facilitated the SEC's efforts to
gather evidence from foreign countries by promoting cooperation among
international securities authorities. 47 Part one of ISECA, Section 101(c),
would have amended Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act 48 to allow the SEC
to conduct a SEC investigation for a violation of a foreign government's
securities laws. 149 ISECA provided that the SEC would have discretion to
grant or deny assistance to a foreign securities regulator. '50 In deciding
whether to grant assistance to a foreign authority, ISECA instructed the
SEC to consider whether assistance would prejudice the public interest of
the United States.' 5' Furthermore, ISECA empowered the SEC to assist a
foreign authority only if the foreign authority agreed to provide similar
assistance to the SEC. 52 Accordingly, ISECA created a strong incentive for
foreign authorities to cooperate with the SEC. 5 3 ISECA did not require
foreign authorities to demonstrate that a matter under investigation consti-
tuted a violation of United States law in order to receive SEC assistance. 54
If ISECA provided SEC assistance only to foreign authorities investigating
conduct that violates United States securities laws, foreign authorities likely
would impose similar restrictions on the SEC. 5 5 Because the SEC must
enforce securities laws that are considerably broader than the securities laws
of most countries, a dual criminality requirement under ISECA greatly
would have restricted the SEC's ability to obtain assistance from foreign
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. S.2544 (1988) (WESTLAW, Federal database, BC database identifier) (noting that
S.2544 was not enacted by Congress).
146. See infra notes 147-173 and accompanying text (analyzing advantages of Congressional
enactment of ISECA).
147. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-01 (1988).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1983). Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act generally limits the
SEC's investigatory authority to inquiries involving laws that the SEC administers. Id.
149. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101(c) (1988).
150. Id. ISECA gave the SEC discretion to grant or refuse to assist an agency of uncertain
legal authority and to respond or refuse to respond to an unreasonable request. See S. REP.
No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988) (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs reporting favorably on ISECA and recommending Senate enact ISECA).
151. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101(c) (1988).
152. Id.
153. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988).
154. S. RaP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1988).
155. Id.
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regulators.'5 6 When the SEC agreed under ISECA to assist a foreign au-
thority, ISECA empowered the SEC to employ the full range of the SEC's
domestic investigative procedures and remedies.'5 7 By increasing the SEC's
authority to cooperate with foreign securities regulators, ISECA sponsors
hoped to enable the SEC to enter into more mutual assistance agreements
and, thereby, to enforce United States securities laws more effectively.5 8
Part two of ISECA, section 102(b), would have amended section 24 of
the Exchange Act and created a narrow exception to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) 59 for foreign documents that foreign law requires
be kept confidential. 60 The amended section 24 would have superceded the
FOIA and authorized the SEC to shield confidential foreign documents if
a foreign securities authority represented in good faith that public disclosure
of the documents would violate the laws of the foreign country.' 6' In some
cases foreign authorities are willing to share confidential information with
the SEC only if the SEC agrees not to make the information public. 62 In
special cases, such as when the SEC goes to trial, foreign authorities waive
foreign secrecy laws and allow the SEC to make the documents public. 63
Foreign authorities often will not allow the SEC to use confidential foreign
documents for investigative purposes, however, because the FOIA requires
the SEC to disclose documents used during an investigation regardless of
any confidential status under foreign law. 64 Consequently, the SEC often
has difficulty in obtaining confidential foreign documents for investigative
purposes. 65 Part two of ISECA would have freed the SEC to obtain
otherwise unobtainable confidential documents and, thereby, enhanced the
SEC's law enforcement capability?66
156. Id. (noting effect of dual criminality requirement).
157. Id. at 8-9. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs indicated
that the SEC should employ established domestic investigative procedures when assisting foreign
authorities. Id. Because the SEC would employ established investigative procedures when
assisting a foreign authority under ISECA, ISECA provided witnesses with the same protections
and remedies that normal SEC proceedings provide. Id. A witness would be entitled to assert
all relevant rights and privileges under United States law because the SEC would take all
testimony pursuant to domestic investigative procedures. Id. Accordingly, ISECA posed no
unique due process or fourth amendment claims under the U.S. Constitution. Id.
158. Id. at 2.
159. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act any person has the right, enforceable in court, of access to federal agency records,
except as exempted by law. Id.
160. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 102(b) (1988).
161. Id. The Senate Committee on Banking has stated that principles of international
comity make it appropriate to exempt from disclosure confidential documents that could not
be disclosed under the laws of the foreign government. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-12 (1988).
162. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988).
163. Id.
164. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
165. S. Rap. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988).
166. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 102(b) (1988).
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Part three of ISECA, also section 102(b), would have amended section
24 of the Exchange Act and authorized the SEC to adjust SEC regulations
that govern access requests for information in SEC possession.'67 The
language of section 24(b) of the Exchange Act arguably restricts the SEC's
authority to share documents and information with foreign regulators and
enforcement officials. 68 By explicitly authorizing the SEC to grant access
to SEC files to foreign regulators, ISECA greatly would have increased the
SEC's ability to cooperate with foreign authorities and to ask foreign
authorities for reciprocal assistance.
69
Part four of ISECA, Title II, would have authorized the SEC to impose
sanctions on or prevent United States registration of securities professionals
that a foreign court or securities authority has adjudged guilty of a securities
violation. 70 To impose sanctions for foreign misconduct, ISECA required
the SEC to determine that the professional had engaged in a practice that
would subject the professional to a SEC disciplinary proceeding if the same
misconduct had occurred in the United States.' 71 Part four would have
alerted securities professionals that the SEC will not permit professionals
to commit securities fraud in a foreign country and then escape repercussion
in the United States. 72
E. Aftermath of the International Securities and Enforcement
Cooperation Act of 1988
Although the Department of Justice, the State Department, the SEC,
the Senate Banking Committee, Democratic Senators, the securities industry,
and the Securities Industry Association supported passage of ISECA, Con-
gress failed to enact ISECA into law in the 1988 session. 73 Congress did
enact part one of ISECA, which authorized SEC investigative assistance to
foreign authorities, as section 6 of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). 74 ITSFEA improves SEC investigative
167. Id.
168. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1988). According to the Senate Banking
Committee, though Section 24(b) of the Exchange Act arguably restricts the SEC's authority
to share documents and information with foreign regulators and enforcement officials, Congress
did not intend to restrict the SEC's authority in this manner. Id.
169. Id. at 12-13.
170. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1988). Title II would have amended Sections
15(b)(4) and 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act, Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, and
Section 203(e) of the Investment Advisors Act to expressly authorize the SEC to impose
sanctions on or to prevent U.S. registration of a securities professional when a foreign authority
has found that the professional engaged in misconduct that would subject the professional to
SEC disciplinary proceedings if the activity had occurred within the United States. Id.
171. Id.
172. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1988).
173. 134 CONG. REc. S17280 (daily ed. October 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Proxmire)
(questioning why Republicans stalled ISECA when no apparent opposition to ISECA existed).
174. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) [hereinafter ITSFEA].
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procedures and remedies for the prevention of insider trading. 75 Section 6
of ITSFEA is identical to part one of ISECA except that ITSFEA does not
require, as a condition to SEC assistance, that the requesting authority
grant reciprocal assistance to the SEC. 7 6 Although Congress does not expect
the SEC to assist foreign authorities that are unwilling to reciprocate,
Congress granted the SEC discretion in ITSFEA to assist nonreciprocating
foreign authorities when the SEC believes that such assistance will spur the
development of a mutual assistance relationship.
177
Although Congress did not enact parts two, three, or four of ISECA
in 1988, Congress may enact ISECA's remaining provisions in 1989.171 On
February 8, 1989, Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) announced his
intention to introduce two bills to Congress in 1989 that would expand SEC
enforcement powers. 79 The first bill would provide an exemption from the
FOIA to protect the confidentiality of documents that foreign governments
provide to the SEC during SEC investigations. 80 The second bill would
authorize the SEC to bring proceedings against individuals on the basis of
violations of foreign securities laws.' Representative Markey's two proposed
bills closely resemble part two and part four of ISECA.1 12 Representative
Markey has not announced whether his two proposed bills will differ in
any important respect from parts two and four of ISECA.8 3 On March 1,
1989 Senator Christopher Dodd introduced the three unenacted provisions
175. Id. ITSFEA provides for greater deterrence, detection, and punishment of insider
trading violations. Id. In addition to enacting part 1 of ISECA, ITSFEA amends Section 21(d)
of the Exchange Act to expand the scope of civil penalties and remedies to include "controlling
persons" who fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading. Id. ITSFEA also initiates
a bounty program that allows the SEC to reward informants. Id. ITSFEA creates a new
Section 15(f) of the Exchange Act and Section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act to require
investment advisers and broker-dealers to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies that
are reasonably designed to prevent misuse of material, nonpublic information by the firm, any
of the firm's employees, or associated persons. Id. ITSFEA amends Section 32 of the Exchange
Act to increase the maximum fines and jail terms for criminal securities law violations. Id.
ITSFEA creates a new Section 20A of the Exchange Act to codify a private right of action
for "contemporaneous traders." Id. Finally, ITSFEA authorizes a study of the adequacy of
current securities laws. Id.
176, Id. at 6.
177. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess, 30 (1988).
178. See infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text (discussing legislative proposals that
might reintroduce ISECA provisions to Congress in 1989).
179. Rep. Markey Says He Will Propose SEC Enforcement Bills, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 231 (Feb. 10, 1989).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 160-67, 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing parts two and four
of ISECA). Apparently, Representative Markey intends to reintroduce the portion of Section
102(b) of ISECA that would amend Section 24 of the Exchange Act to create a narrow
exception from the Freedom of Information Act for foreign documents that applicable foreign
law requires be kept confidential. Rep. Markey Says He Will Propose SEC Enforcement Bills,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (ENA) 231 (Feb. 10, 1989).
183. Id.
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of ISECA as the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of
1989.184
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
By enacting part one of ISECA as section 6 of ITSFEA, Congress took
a positive first step toward addressing the problem of international securities
fraud.' 5 Section 6 of ITSFEA sends a worldwide message that the United
States regards securities fraud as an international problem that the inter-
national community must tackle together. 186 By authorizing SEC investigative
assistance to foreign authorities, Congress made clear that the United States
will help other nations enforce their securities laws.8 7 Because under section
6 of ITSFEA the SEC is unlikely to assist a foreign authority that will not
provide similar assistance to the SEC, Congress has created a strong incentive
for foreign authorities to assist the SEC and to enter into favorable assistance
agreements with the SEC.' The SEC has made more progress in interna-
tional securities enforcement through cooperative agreements than through
any other enforcement tool.'8 9 Assistance agreements, or memoranda of
understanding, allow the SEC to avoid United States compulsory processes
that foreign nations often view as a challenge to the sovereignty of the
foreign jurisdiction.190 Cooperative agreements offer other significant ad-
vantages to the SEC. 191 An agreement can establish detailed procedures
governing international enforcement of securities laws.'9 2 An agreement also
can establish a timetable for handling SEC requests and place reasonable
limitations on a party's right to appeal a foreign authority's decision to
184. S. 646, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). In addition to S. 646, four other bills designed
to reform the securities market were introduced to the Senate on March 1, 1989. See The
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, S. 647, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); The
Market Reform Act of 1989, S. 648, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); The Shareholders Com-
munication Improvement Act of 1989, S. 649, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); The Trust
Indenture Act of 1989, S. 651, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
185. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text (analyzing Part 1 of ISECA); infra
notes 186-94 and accompanying text (analyzing effect of ITSFEA section 6 on international
enforcement of United States securities laws).
186. See 134 CoNo. REc. S8318 (daily ed. June 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Riegle)
(stating that Congress views securities fraud as international problem requiring international
cooperation).
187. ITSEA, supra note 175.
188. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (analyzing effects of reciprocal
assistance provision of ISECA).
189. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's progress in inter-
national enforcement of securities laws through memoranda of understanding).
190. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing foreign nations' resentment
of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws).
191. See supra notes 114-37 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's use of cooperative
agreements to enforce U.S. securities laws internationally).
192. See Pitt, supra note 6, at 435-37 (discussing MOU procedures that facilitate inter-
national enforcement of securities laws).
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grant the SEC access to information. 193 Finally, because agreements are not
formal treaties, the SEC may enter agreements without waiting for lengthy
Senate ratification.19
Although enacting section 6 of ITSFEA is a positive first step toward
reducing international securities fraud, Congress must act quickly to au-
thorize further international enforcement tools for the SEC. 19 If Congress
will grant the SEC a limited exception to the FOIA, the SEC could obtain
valuable business information that foreign authorities presently are unwilling
to provide. 9 6 Because the FOIA does not allow the SEC to assure foreign
authorities that confidential foreign documents will remain confidential,
foreign authorities often refuse to disclose valuable information to the
SEC.' 7 Consequently, the FOIA currently hampers the SEC's investigative
abilities.'98 The SEC does not seek to be immune from the provisions of
the FOIA. 99 The SEC desires only a narrow exception to the FOIA that
would allow the SEC to honoi the decision of a foreign nation to keep
sensitive documents confidential.w Because the FOIA exception would allow
the SEC to shield sensitive documents when a foreign nation requests
confidentiality, the FOIA exception preserves the international comity that
the SEC needs to operate effectively. 20' By enacting a narrow exception to
the FOIA for sensitive foreign documents, Congress would enable the SEC
to obtain otherwise unobtainable information and, thereby, strengthen the
SEC's international enforcement powers.
20 2
Congress also should enact legislation that would clarify the SEC's
authority to make rules governing access to information in the possession
of the SEC.203 The SEC's ability to provide information to foreign authorities
is important to the success of the cooperative approach to international
securities enforcement.? Section 24(b) of the Exchange Act arguably pre-
vents the SEC from sharing documents in SEC possession with foreign
authorities. 20 If Congress truly intends for the United States to take an
internationally cooperative approach to securities law enforcement, the SEC
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Mann, supra note 1, at 96-97 (concluding that Congress must enact more effective
securities legislation to improve SEC international enforcement powers).
196. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text (analyzing effect of FOIA exception
on ability of SEC enforce United States securities laws internationally).
197. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988).
198. Id.
199. SEC Support Memo, supra note 59, at 89,115-16.
200. Id.
201. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988).
202. Id. at 10-11.
203. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (analyzing Part three of ISECA).
204. Id.
205. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting conclusion of Senate Banking
Committee that Section 24(b) of Exchange Act arguably prevents SEC from sharing documents
in SEC possession with foreign authorities).
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must have the authority to cooperate with foreign authorities by providing
documents to aid foreign regulators in their securities investigations.6 If
the SEC cannot share information with foreign authorities, the SEC cannot
expect foreign authorities to cooperate with the SEC.=
Finally, Congress should legislate to impose sanctions on securities
professionals that engage in misconduct in foreign nations. 28 If Congress
enables the SEC to cooperate more fully with foreign authorities, foreign
authorities may initiate more enforcement or disciplinary proceedings against
unscrupulous securities professionals.N In light of the magnitude of the
international securities fraud problem and heightened public concern, a
securities professional who violates foreign laws should not find a haven
from retribution in the United States.210 The United States should act
affirmatively to deprive persons who violate foreign securities laws of any
opportunity to violate American securities laws. 21'
V. CONCLUSION
Congress must take significant steps to improve cooperation between
the SEC and foreign regulators in the enforcement of securities laws. 212
Internationalization of the capital markets increases more rapidly each
year.23 Opportunities for securities fraud also are increasing. 214 In more and
more cases, the SEC must obtain information from witnesses who reside in
a foreign country and examine evidence located in a foreign country. 215
Current SEC powers are inadequate to police the securities markets for
international securities fraud. 216 If Congress does not improve the SEC's
ability to enforce United States securities law in an increasingly international
market, the average American investor will enter the market at a severe
disadvantage. 21 7 While the average American investor must abide by the
rules of the securities market, a trader with foreign connections may evade
206. SEC Support Memo, supra note 59, at 89,100.
207. Id. at 110.
208. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing ISECA's sanctions on
securities professional that foreign countries have found guilty of misconduct).
209. S. REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1988).
210. Id.
211. SEC Support Memo, supra note 59, at 89,118.
212. See supra notes 21-24, 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts between
U.S. and foreign securities law).
213, See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing internationalization of secu-
rities markets).
214. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discussing increased opportunities for
securities fraud).
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of current SEC
international enforcement powers).
217. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing imbalance in application of
U.S. securities laws).
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the laws by using foreign banks.21 1 Such a difference in accountability is
unfair and mandates Congressional action.
219
F. Russell Du Puy, III
218. Id.
219. Id.; see S, REP. No. 461, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-31 (1988) (recommending Con-
gressional action to improve SEC international enforcement powers).
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